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published on May 13, 2021
John H. Boyer, Daniel C. Wagner
https://doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc2021512129
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas on
What is ¡°Better-Known¡± in Natural Science
Aristotelian commenters have long noted an apparent contradiction between what Aristotle¡¯s says in Posterior Analytics I.2 and Physics I.1 about how we obtain first principles of a science. At Posterior 71b35¨C72a6, Aristotle states that what is most universal (¦Ê¦Á¦È?¦Ë¦Ï¦Ô) is better-known by nature and initially less-known to us, while the particular (¦Ê¦Á¦È¡¯ ?¦Ê¦Á¦Ò¦Ó¦Ï¦Í) is initially better-known to us, but less-known by nature. At Physics 184a21-30, however, Aristotle states that we move from what is better-known to us, which is universal (¦Ê¦Á¦È?¦Ë¦Ï¦Ô), to what is better-known absolutely, which is particular (¦Ê¦Á¦È¡¯ ?¦Ê¦Á¦Ò¦Ó¦Ï¦Í). This paper turns to two of Aristotle¡¯s most notable medieval commentators¡ªAlbertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas¡ªto resolve this apparent contradiction. The key to Thomas and Albert¡¯s solutions, we will argue, is a twofold distinction between a sense-perceptive and scientific universal, and the particulars as sensed individuals and as differentiating attributes. Our Synthetic treatment of these distinctions contributes to the ongoing scholarly effort to understand the Stagyrite¡¯s complex theory of knowledge.