ONLINE FIRST
published on October 30, 2023
Patrick Fisher
https://doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc20231027152
The Metaphysics of Mathematical Explanation in Science
Platonist and Nominalist Problems and Aristotelian Solutions
Debates between contemporary platonist and nominalist conceptions of the metaphysical status of mathematical objects have recently included discussions of explanations of physical phenomena in which mathematics plays an indispensable role, termed mathematical explanations in science (MES). I will argue that MES
requires an ontology that can (1) ground claims about mathematical necessity as distinct from physical necessity and (2) explain how that mathematical necessity
applies to the physical world. I contend that nominalism fails to meet the first criterion and platonism the second. I then articulate an alternative, Aristotelian approach to mathematical objects and defend such a view as meeting both criteria.