ONLINE FIRST
published on June 28, 2025
M. T. Lu
https://doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc2025626175
Piety and the Intellect
I have previously argued that piety can be properly understood as an Aristotelian natural moral virtue. In this paper I will argue that piety should also be understood as contributing to the proper operation of the intellect. In other words, even though piety is properly understood as a moral virtue of the will, it nonetheless has important implications for knowing. After briefly reviewing how and why piety is a natural moral virtue I will discuss how piety has important epistemic implications in that it functions like a ¡°virtue of attention¡± similar to St. Thomas¡¯ virtues of studiositas and docilitas. I close with some remarks about why this aspect of piety receives little explicit discussion in the texts of Aristotle and Thomas even though I am confident that it fits into their conception of knowledge and its relationship to moral virtue.