ONLINE FIRST
published on July 13, 2025
James Kintz
https://doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc2025710180
Person without Relation? A Non-Aristotelian (but Thomistic) Response
The nature of personhood is not only an important discussion in contemporary philosophy but is also of central importance to the Thomistic philosophical and theological system. Yet the precise nature of personhood on this Thomistic system remains unclear, specifically as it concerns relationality. Some have argued that relationality, particularly interpersonal relationality, is intrinsic to what it is to be a person. But recent authors have either ignored or rejected this claim. In this paper I reintroduce and defend the idea that relationality is essential to personhood on a Thomistic model. Focusing on the nature of the second-person relation, as well as on the theological concept of the Trinity, I suggest that we cannot present a Thomistic account of personhood without reference to our capacity to enter into intrinsically reciprocal interpersonal relationships. This ultimately reveals that to be a person is to be essentially relational.