Volume 96, Issue 1, Winter 2022
Elliot Polsky
Pages 21-45
https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2021122241
Secondary Substance and Quod Quid Erat Esse
Aquinas on Reconciling the Divisions of ¡°Substance¡± in the Categories and Metaphysics
Modern commentators recognize the irony of Aristotle¡¯s Categories becoming a central text for Platonic schools. For similar reasons, these commentators would perhaps be surprised to see Aquinas¡¯s In VII Metaphysics, where he apparently identifies the secondary substance of Aristotle¡¯s Categories with a false Platonic sense of ¡°substance¡± as if, for Aristotle, only Platonists would say secondary substances are substances. This passage in Aquinas¡¯s commentary has led Mgr. Wippel to claim that, for Aquinas, secondary substance and essence are not the same thing and that Aristotle¡¯s notion of essence is absent from the Categories. This paper¡ªby closely analyzing the apparently contradictory divisions of ¡°substance¡± in Aquinas¡¯s In V and VII Metaphysics¡ªshows that essence and secondary substance are not altogether distinct for Aquinas. Moreover, when the Categories is viewed by Aquinas as a work of logic, it is found largely to cut across the disputes between Platonism and Aristotelianism.