ONLINE FIRST
published on March 30, 2023
Travis Butler
https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2023329266
The Place of Pleasure in Neo-Aristotelian Ethics
Richard Kraut argues that Neo-Aristotelian ethics should include a com?mitment to ¡°diluted hedonism,¡± according to which the exercise of a developed life-capacity is good for S only if and partly because S enjoys it. I argue that the Neo-Aristotelian should reject diluted hedonism for two reasons: first, it compro?mises the generality and elegance of the initial developmentalist account; second, it leads to mistaken evaluations of some of the most important and ennobling capacities and activities in human life. Finally, I argue that a more plausible ac?count of the place of pleasure in the good life derives from Aristotle¡¯s discussion in book X of the Nicomachean Ethics: pleasure is a supervenient good that signifies the value of the underlying capacity and activity, but it is not a necessary condition for their goodness.