Volume 98, Issue 2, Spring 2024
Special Issue on Anselm
Tomas Ekenberg
Pages 159-177
https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq202463292
Experience and Ontology in Anselm¡¯s Argument
In this article, I examine two ways to approach Anselm¡¯s argument: as a logical demonstration and as a persuasive piece of reasoning¡ªone that notably persuaded Anselm himself. First, I follow Ermanno Bencivenga and argue that Anselm¡¯s argument is a logical illusion. The deduction is not simply invalid, nor is it simply unsound; instead, it appeals to two mutually inconsistent sets of assumptions, each of which is rationally defensible. Consequently, the argument emerges as either valid or sound, but not both simultaneously. I also argue that this peculiar piece of reasoning should not be classified as an ¡°ontological¡± argument. When interpreted as a persuasive piece of reasoning, the argument appeals to experience¡ªan experience of something alluded to by the phrase ¡°something than which nothing greater can be thought.¡± Here, the logical apparatus primarily serves to channel and refine contemplation on this experience.