ONLINE FIRST
published on September 24, 2015
Chris Tweedt
https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201592347
Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil
The inductive argument from evil contains the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil. According to traditional formulations, the argument for this premise involves an inference¡ªa ¡°noseeum¡± inference¡ªfrom the proposition that we don¡¯t see a good reason for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil. One brand of skeptical theism involves using a principle¡ªCORNEA¡ªto block the inference. Recently, however, the common sense problem of evil threatens the relevance of these skeptical theists¡¯ project. Proponents of the common sense problem of evil hold that there need not be any inference to justify the belief that there is gratuitous evil. Rather, someone can have non-inferential prima facie justification, or at least a pro tanto reason, for her belief that there is gratuitous evil. In this paper, I argue that the common sense problem of evil doesn¡¯t avoid CORNEA and that CORNEA, or a reformulated version of it, helps prevent anyone from having any justification for the belief that there is gratuitous evil.