ONLINE FIRST
published on October 27, 2017
Andrew Moon
https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil2017102688
Plantinga¡¯s Religious Epistemology, Skeptical Theism, and Debunking Arguments
Alvin Plantinga¡¯s religious epistemology has been used to respond to many debunking arguments against theistic belief. However, critics have claimed that Plantinga¡¯s religious epistemology conflicts with skeptical theism, a view often used in response to the problem of evil. If they are correct, then a common way of responding to debunking arguments conflicts with a common way of responding to the problem of evil. In this paper, I examine the critics¡¯ claims and argue that they are right. I then present two revised versions of Plantinga¡¯s argument for his religious epistemology. I call the first a religion-based argument and the second an intention-based argument. Both are compatible with skeptical theism, and both can be used to respond to debunking arguments. They apply only to theistic beliefs of actual persons who have what I call doxastically valuable relationships with God¡ªvaluable relationships the goods of which entail the belief that God exists.