ONLINE FIRST
published on December 31, 2020
Charles K. Fink
https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20201230157
Acting with Good Intentions
Virtue Ethics and the Principle that Ought Implies Can
In Morals from Motives (2001), Michael Slote proposed an agent-based approach to virtue ethics in which the morality of an action derives solely from the agent¡¯s motives. Among the many objections that have been raised against Slote¡¯s account, this article addresses two problems associated with the Kantian principle that ought implies can. These are the problems of ¡°deficient¡± and ¡°inferior¡± motivation. These problems arise because people cannot freely choose their motives. We cannot always choose to act from good motives; nor can we always avoid acting from bad ones. Given this, Slote¡¯s account implies that we sometimes cannot do what we ought to do, contrary to Kant¡¯s principle. In this article, I propose an alternative agent-based account which, I argue, circumvents these problems. While people cannot choose their motives, they can choose their intentions. By characterizing virtuous action, as I do, in terms of good intentions rather than in terms of good motives, the conflict between what people can do and what they ought to do is resolved.