Volume 47, 2022
Rik Peels

Pages 237-242
https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2022112202
Proper Social and Epistemic Expectations In Speech Exchange: Reply to Goldberg
I first list what I consider to be the main virtues of Goldberg¡¯s novel and challenging account of epistemic pressure in speech exchange. I then zoom in on proper doxastic responses to assertions in conversations and argue that they comprise four things: (1) one believes the position that is testified to rather than just seeking, ensuring, trying, or aiming to believe the testifier on that proposition; (2) one believes the testifier; in other words, one wrongs the speaker not only if one disbelieves her but also when one simply fails to believe her; (3) one believes the relevant proposition rather than merely accepting, presuming, assuming, or displaying some positive propositional attitude that does not imply belief; (4) one believes the proposition in question to a sufficiently high degree. Finally, I explore how we should make sense of the epistemic partiality that friendship seems to come with. I argue that it is not merely that one seeks evidence in support of the assertion of one¡¯s friend or an interpretation that affirms the testimony of one¡¯s friend. It is also that one actually lowers the evidential bar for rationally or epistemically justifiedly believing their testimony.