Volume 44, Issue 1/2, 2012/2013
Mark Alznauer
Pages 67-92
https://doi.org/10.5840/owl201310214
The Role of "Morality" in Hegel's Theory of Action
Michael Quante has successfully shown that the ¡°Morality¡± section of Hegel¡¯s Philosophy of Right provides an account of the cognitive conditions that must be satisfied for the imputation of actions. In this essay, I argue that Quante¡¯s picture of these conditions is misleadingly cropped, obscuring the fact that the specific cognitive conditions Hegel places on agency are much stronger than has been recognized, and of a different kind. This suggests a much different interpretation of Hegel¡¯s philosophy of action, one that treats action not as a psychological matter, but as conceptually linked to responsibility in a juridical and moral sense.