Volume 48, Issue 1/2, 2016/2017
Kenneth R. Westphal
Pages 1-44
https://doi.org/10.5840/owl201752719
Hegel, Natural Law & Moral Constructivism
This paper argues that Hegel¡¯s Philosophical Outlines of Justice develops an incisive natural law theory by providing a comprehensive moral theory of a modern republic. Hegel¡¯s Outlines adopt and augment a neglected species of moral constructivism which is altogether neutral about moral realism, moral motivation, and whether reasons for action are linked ¡®internally¡¯ or ¡®externally¡¯ to motives. Hegel shows that, even if basic moral norms and institutions are our artefacts, they are strictly objectively valid because for our very finite form of semi-rational embodied agency they are necessary and because sufficient justifying grounds for these norms and institutions can be addressed to all persons. Hegel¡¯s moral constructivism identifies and justifies the core content of a natural law theory, without invoking metaphysical issues of moral realism, anti-realism, irrealism or ¡®truth makers¡¯ (of moral propositions), etc. I begin with Socrates¡¯ question to Euthyphro to distinguish between moral realism and moral irrealism (¡ì2). I then summarise basic points of constructivist method (¡ì3) and how Hume¡¯s theory of justice inaugurates this distinctive species of natural law constructivism (¡ì4). How this approach addresses issues of political legitimacy is highlighted by Rousseau¡¯s juridical innovation (¡ì5). How this approach is better articulated and justified by Kant¡¯s specifically Critical method is briefly considered in connection with his justification of rights to possession (¡ì6), so that we can then recognise Hegel¡¯s natural law constructivism in his Outlines (¡ì7). Hegel¡¯s account of rights to possession corresponds closely to Kant¡¯s (¡ì8), and his account of juridical relations as human interrelations accords with natural law constructivism (¡ì9). This finding is corroborated by some central features of Hegel¡¯s account of Sittlichkeit, including how Hegel adopts, undergirds and augments Rousseau¡¯s and Kant¡¯s Independence Requirement for political legitimacy (¡ì10).