ONLINE FIRST
published on June 14, 2025
E. J. Coffman
https://doi.org/10.5840/tht202561048
On the Powers of Predetermined Free Agents
Must a predetermined free agent have it within their power to break a law of nature? Brian Looper (2021) argues for an affirmative answer in the course of defending an influential version of the Consequence Argument against a famous objection due to David Lewis (1981). I argue that Looper¡¯s defense of Lewis¡¯s focal version of the Consequence Argument fails. After reconstructing the relevant version of the Consequence Argument along with Lewis¡¯s famous objection to it, I explain Looper¡¯s defense of the Consequence Argument against Lewis¡¯s objection. I then argue that Looper¡¯s defense of the Consequence Argument depends on an as yet inadequately motivated claim about agents¡¯ abilities.