It is well-known that Kierkegaard is critical of Hegel’s dialectical method, especially of determinate negation and mediation that move his dialectic along. Previous scholars have focused on Kierkegaard’s existential critiques of Hegel’s dialectic—why it cannot be transferred to ethical-religious life—but Kierkegaard’s metaphysical critiques of Hegel’s dialectical method—why it may not work even in abstract thought with abstract concepts—have gone largely unstudied. This article analyzes Kierkegaard’s critiques of Hegel’s dialectical method itself—as it functions in speculative thought. This article begins with an examination of Hegel’s dialectical method, follows with an analysis of Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel’s dialectical method—especially of determinate negation and mediation—and concludes with an analysis of how Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel’s method in general underlies his belief that Hegelian dialectical reason cannot think religious concepts in particular.

The Aristotelian view on the relation of the soul to its powers, as presented in De Anima, holds that the forms of organic beings are actualities in potential to further actualities. This view seems to conflict with his treatment of form in Metaphysics and other parts of De Anima, and so leaves us with the problem of the unity and actuality of the soul as form. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica holds a view on this topic differing from that of Aristotle. We see that Aquinas says powers are proper attributes of the soul. This view preserves the unity and causality of form. Aquinas is defended, especially through an elucidation of how proper attributes relate to the substantial form giving rise to them.

This paper presents an enactive approach to Neo-Confucian ethics, with a particular focus on Wang Yangming’s (王陽明 1472–1529) concepts of the heart-mind (xin 心) and moral knowledge (liangzhi 良知). While traditional ethical models in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism emphasize grounding ethical life in universal rational principles or in the cultivation of a moral mind, this paper seeks to clarify these assumptions by drawing on the enactive insight of groundlessness. It argues that, rather than resting on a fixed and isolated metaphysical ground, any moral mind, if it exists, must manifest through embodied interaction and engagement with the world. This perspective reconceptualizes the moral mind and liangzhi as more than cognitive processes confined to the head; instead, they are understood as part of an integrated mind-body-world system, characterized by embodied, contextually grounded, and beyond-self-aware coping mechanisms. By redefining these elements, this paper aims to deepen our understanding of Neo-Confucian ethics and contribute meaningfully to broader philosophical discussions on moral agency, autonomy, and moral responsibility.

Building on previous work synthesising the metaphysics of the divine in Aquinas, Palamas, and Scotus, this paper outlines how God’s contingent, ad extra actions relate to his immutability and simplicity. Using the concept of intrinsic ramifications of the simple divine form and a spatial/geometrical model of the divine ideas, it is shown that his relations to creation are real in him (not merely extrinsically denominated) without adding to his actuality or knowledge. His spontaneous creative choice and energy are a necessary formality in him, but were genuinely contingent as to what was chosen. This free choice determines the form that the plurality of energies (as metaformalities) take in creation. Freedom is possible for creatures in our universe due to quantum theory. State reduction is where libertarian free will can act. God’s singular creative act of picking out a world (across its history) in toto will have two moments if creation itself contains freedom: the first chooses a world-type with particular initial conditions and patterns of change, the second actualises a particular world of that world-type, including by “granting existence to” the set of creaturely free choices that distinguish that world from others of the type. This allowing of existence to creatures’ acts of free will, unlike all other divine providence, does not involve determining essence, as the creatures determine their own volitional essence. Instead, the second moment can be understood at each free-will event either as God knowingly actualising the existence of the chooser who freely chooses a certain way, or a permissive divine choice that does not involve predetermination but combines with intuitive cognition of what the creature chooses to “respond” accordingly. This second, non-predetermining option results in a providence not based on prior decree of every detail.

The study considered the concept of motherhood in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its possibilities in contemporary ethical debates related to the family, gender roles, and social justice. To achieve the research objective, a literature search and critical review was conducted through Google Scholar, PubMed, Scopus, and ScienceDirect databases using keywords related to maternal ethics, family philosophy, and Kantian ethics. The results of the study showed that Kantian ethics can be adapted to take into account the moral aspects of motherhood, but there are significant contradictions and limitations in its application to contemporary conceptions of the family. In particular, the Kantian emphasis on rationality and autonomy is often at odds with the realities of motherhood, which involves emotional involvement and care. By exploring how Kantian ethics intersects with modern feminist critiques, the research opens new avenues for understanding the ethical significance of motherhood beyond traditional paradigms. The analysis suggests that Kant’s focus on duty and moral law can be reinterpreted to emphasize care and relational ethics, offering a more inclusive framework that recognizes the emotional and social complexities of parenting. This provides a foundation for integrating Kantian philosophy with practical ethical solutions in family life, allowing for a new conceptual framework for understanding motherhood as a multidimensional role that combines autonomy, care, and moral development. Such a synthesis enriches both philosophical research and practical approaches to family dynamics in the modern world, creating opportunities for further study and rethinking of the role of motherhood through the prism of classical ethics.

This essay explores five aporiae in which the historical condition of humanity reaches intrinsic limits that cannot be overcome by its own resources, namely: (1) the problem of moral evil, (2) its past consequences, (3) the integrality of body and soul (4) the conditions for complete happiness, and (5) the dynamics of friendship. When synthesized, the distinct force of each argument converges upon a common conclusion. Human existence subsists between two trajectories, only one of which corresponds with reason. It either verges on an abyss of absurdity, or it is saved by the rise of theological, divinely revealed horizons.

Charles Taylor is one of the most important philosophers writing today. He has both chronicled and to some extent explained the profound cultural revolution of the West that is called secularism along with its close associate called pluralism. Nevertheless, he has struggled throughout his vast corpus to examine and reevaluate the deeper epistemological and ontological structures that underly this pervasive cultural revolution. His recent text with Hubert Dreyfus Retrieving Realism is perhaps his most concentrated effort to pursue this more technical philosophical issue. This paper argues that there are key aspects of this effort that can be transposed to a consideration of the central Christian notion and doctrine concerning”death and bodily resurrection,” giving this question and issue a renewed philosophical valence.

According to C. S. Lewis, Naturalism is beset by a “cardinal difficulty.” It can be known to be true only by way of valid reasoning—something precluded by Naturalism itself. The Naturalist’s belief in Naturalism hasn’t been caused by a rational argument; it has resulted instead from irrational causes. In the face of Elizabeth Anscombe’s powerful and searching criticisms, Lewis significantly revised his argument against Naturalism for the 1960 edition of his book Miracles. Anscombe’s last words on Lewis’ argument were delivered at a meeting of the Oxford C. S. Lewis Society, November 12, 1985. The rewritten argument, she contends, is “genuinely problematic.” First, it fails to answer a question Lewis says it must: what is the connection between the logical grounds of a belief and its actual occurrence? Secondly, it invokes the “damnably obscure proposition ‘knowledge determined only by the truth it knows’”—a proposition “obviously crucial” to Lewis’ case, but which he sadly “doesn’t explore.” I argue that Anscombe last words here are mistaken on both counts.

The classic “retorsion” argument that any claim that all thought is relative is a self-refuting dialectical contradiction not only decisively refutes relativism but also demonstrates the presence of absolute truth in all thinking as its implicit enabling condition. In Augustine’s version, this takes the form of showing that truth itself, which Augustine identifies as God, is the “light of minds,” found within the soul by thought’s self-reflexive discovery of the ever-present condition for its own acts of judgment. In recent philosophy this argument is taken up in the transcendental Thomism of Pierre Scheuer, S.J., and, with important clarifying distinctions, in the objective idealism of Vittorio H?sle. Thomas Nagel uses the same argument to reach what amounts to the same conclusion, though he does not call this conclusion ‘God.’ This concurrence indicates that there is no third alternative between complete nihilism and divinity as conceived by Augustine, Scheuer, and H?sle.

In his paper, I focus on Genesis’ account of Adam’s task of naming the animals to show its bearing on a contemporary philosophical dispute between Kantian anti-realism and Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual realism. For help in my project, I call on Charles Taylor who draws an important distinction between human language and animal communication and along the way, I call on Wittgenstein’s distinction between a primitive language and primitive concept of language. My analysis of Adam’s task shows that Kant (the Christian) holds a view that significantly diverges from the Genesis myth while Merleau-Ponty (the secularist) holds a view that is significantly aligned with it.

There has been much scholarly discussion regarding the supposed inadequacies of the traditional account of lying, the general form of which can be seen in Augustine’s De mendacio (On Lying), 3–4. This account, stated simply, is that a subject S lies if and only if S says something that S believes to be false, and S says that with the intent to deceive another. But recent contributions to the philosophy of lying press our intuitions on this final condition. They point to counterexamples which seem to show that the intention to deceive clause is not a necessary condition for lying. If correct, this would drastically change our understanding of lying, and it would perhaps make it more difficult to see the moral wrongness of different types of lying. Contrary to this trend, Jennifer Lackey, in her essay, “Lying and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce” (2013) brings deception back into our account of lying. Her essay serves as a prominent example of a “Deceptionist” account of lying. In this essay, I shall first outline my own view, which I’ve called “Neo-Augustinian,” but which also builds on some of Lackey’s interventions. I then further motivate Lackey’s moves by looking at the three main types of lies that are used as counterexamples to the traditional account and show that they are unsuccessful for both Lackey’s account and mine. I shall then turn to a consideration and extended discussion of my own definition of lying through such examples. My Neo-Augustinian, Lackey-style account will be seen to best handle these difficult examples, retrieve the intuitive moral wrongness of lying, and vindicate important elements of Augustine’s original analysis of lying in the De mendacio. Nevertheless, my account does not require adopting Augustine’s absolutism regarding lies; hence, it is importantly Neo-Augustinian rather than strictly Augustinian.

Aristotle presents what seem to be two different definitions of color, in De anima and in De sensu, respectively. The former seems more intelligible, while the latter has been largely ignored, not only because the work in which it is found receives little scholarly attention but because this definition is more cryptic. I present an overview of the puzzles surrounding this second definition and develop the explanation presented by Thomas Aquinas. To illuminate this explanation I point out similarities and differences between it and that provided by one of the very few modern attempts at interpretation.

What, if anything, does singular causal language teach us about causation? I start with some observations about causal language and then explore some lessons about causation. This note has two major parts. First, I rehearse and reinforce some arguments that purport to show that the context-sensitivity of causal language is semantic. Second, I discuss how this could inform the metaphysics of causation, ultimately arguing that it leads to a novel form of causal pluralism. The main claim is conditional: if the context- sensitivity of causal language is semantic, there are more concepts of causation than we previously thought. I conclude with some speculations regarding where this leaves the classic metaphysical debate about the nature of causation.

In this work, we make the claim that artificial intelligence (AI) machines do not compare with human-beings in task performance. We explore how the human-being interacts with the world, with beings and the being of beings, and how it circumspects reality. We argue that AI arrives on the scene too late; or just on-time-enough to perform a given task assigned to it, as extension of the human-being. We discuss that it is short-sighted to claim that AI will exceed all levels of human intelligence. We particularly focus on works by continental thinkers, and how problematic assumptions on the nature of reality (including the ontological assumption) have led to faulty paradigms comparing the human-being with AI.

The quest for knowledge, for Socrates, is a holistic approach in which the subject is required to transform himself. This brings Socrates’ philosophy closer to the self-enhancement practice of spiritualism. The present study tries to explore the spiritual hue in the key thoughts of Socrates, viz., self-knowledge, goodness, knowledge and virtue, conscious ignorance, training for death, and the investigative methods he used like irony, midwifery method, and dialectic method, etc. The work is an analytical study based on the relevant published works and the dialogues of Plato in which the character Socrates represents the philosophy of the historical Socrates.

When developing his account of happiness (eudaimonia) in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle twice invokes the fate of Priam to caution readers about the potential devastations of misfortune. He states that “no one calls happy” (oudeis eudaimonizei) a person who has suffered such a fate, but his reasoning on the topic is the subject of debate. In this paper, I give a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s account of Priam and argue that, according to the most consonant reading of the text, Priam’s suffering impacts his happiness only if, and only to the extent that, it prevents excellent activity. My analysis opposes an influential interpretation of the relationship between happiness and external goods recently defended by Timothy Roche.

Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty each consider what was taken to be the decline of Western thought. The works of Husserl and Heidegger will be briefly considered, along with Merleau-Ponty’s evaluation of his two great predecessors, while Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy will be featured here in some detail. The case will be made that Merleau-Ponty challenges the veracity of Western thought but finds in it the seeds of a new form of rationality. What Merleau-Ponty regards as a rationality that focused exclusively on abstract rational principles to the extent that specific circumstances were ignored is rejected for a new form of rationality, one that is rooted in the body’s perceptual engagement with the world. How Merleau-Ponty defines this new form of rationality will be explored.

In the concluding chapter of The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick proposes a religious solution to a “fundamental contradiction” of practical reason. In this paper, I raise an objection to Sidgwick’s religious solution to his assumed dualism of practical reason. Then I describe ways of amending his solution in order to avoid the objection. The amendments have shortcomings. I conclude that Sidgwick’s dualism is in need of a non-religious solution.

Spinoza devoted Chapter VI of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus to the question of the miracle, which he considers illusory because it constitutes a purely natural phenomenon. However, he attributed to it a social and pedagogical function capable of preserving the power of the sovereign. I will analyze Spinoza’s theory of the miracle and then Hume’s theory, in order to compare them, and thus highlight the specific problems posed by their thesis. I will then analyze Hume’s probabilistic approach, by examining Bayses’ theorem. I will then examine the epistemological status of testimonial knowledge. Finally, I will confront the theories of Spinoza and Hume with R. Sa‘adyah G’aon’s notion of certainty and Maimonides’ conception of miracle

A standard reading of the argumentation for Ethics Ip11 has Spinoza contending that because there is no reason or cause for the non-existence of God, God exists, Here I grant that in Ip11 Spinoza is appealing to the claim that there is no reason or cause for the non-existence of God. However, I argue that he is assuming that the existence of God is obvious from Ip7 and Ip8s2 and then positing that because there is nothing that could impede or annul the existence of God, God is a necessary existent. I begin with a discussion of Descartes’s view that the necessary existence of God is independent existence and then I move on to a discussion of the view as it appears in Ip11.

This article intends to discover the function of phantasia for phronesis. Its main idea is that the practically wise person has the right sort of phantasia associated with the right kind of pleasure and pain and that through the medium of pleasure and pain phronesis and phantasia become connected. First, I examine what Aristotle means when he says that phronesis is a special kind of practical perception which is concerned with ethical particulars. Second, I illustrate the function of phantasia, especially deliberative phantasia, for the ethical agent based on the essential proposition that phantasia has a motivational force based on its representation of things as objects of desire. The virtuous man has the right kind of practical phantasia and phantasmata in the sense that things appear to him as good or pleasurable in the way they are really so. Finally, I argue that natural phantasia and phantasmata which we possess from birth need to be transformed by the practical intellect so that they might acquire moral values; and the pleasure which the virtuous man takes in doing good actions consolidates his virtuous characters so that he can act out of a settled and steadfast dispositions.

The following essay considers Luis de Losada’s thinking with respect to the scholastic dispute between univocity and analogy. Noteworthy is the fact that the conclusions he reaches are at odds with those of Francisco Suarez, whom the younger Jesuit otherwise regards with unmitigated filial devotion. Though Losada differs from his master regarding analogy, the position he puts forth capitalizes upon a distinction between a logico-semantic perspective and a metaphysical perspective. The result is an irenic balance among all the schools (Thomistic, Scotist, and Jesuit) regarding univocity and analogy. Nevertheless, Losada goes beyond the discussions dividing proponents of analogy and those of univocity when he inquires whether any kind of analogical community obtains between real being and beings of reason. Remarkably, he answers that there is a univocal community, thereby embracing the scholastic notion of supertranscendentality.

In his work Bruno, Schelling elaborates for the first time a concept of freedom and independence of the finite that extends through his reformulation in Philosophy and Religion of 1804, to the Freedom Essay of 1809 and beyond to the works of 1810 and 1811—Stuttgart Private Lectures and The Ages of the World. The question we will address in this article—taking a necessary detour through Bruno themes—concerns the status of the finite as such and how it is at all possible to admit both the existence of a world of finite beings as it appears to consciousness and the positing of an Absolute and infinite principle of philosophy. We will show how Schelling’s interest shifts, almost unintentionally, from the infinite principle to the finite as such, as a principle of freedom and self-initiation independent of the real. The split opened by the duality of the two principles will continue in Philosophy and Religion of 1804 and will become more evident in the other works of the 1800s that are the subject of our broader philosophical interest. In analyzing Bruno, we fill for the first time a major existing gap in Schelling’s now-renowned middle metaphysics culminating in his Freedom Essay of 1809 as well as proving its inception in the unresolved problems of the system prior to 1809.

Utterances of explicit performatives, such as “I order you to close the door,” have the forces named by the appearing verbs; here, the utterance has the force of ordering. These utterances utilize declarative sentences, which usually indicate the force of statements, rather than of any verbs contained in them. This leads many to theorize that explicit performatives are statements that cause their hearers to infer the forces they name. This article argues against this account on the grounds that it is based on the false premise that hearers can unconsciously recognize illocutionary forces. Instead, I put forward the account that explicit performatives are nothing but the acts with the forces that they name.

Supporters of the Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion mainly explore emotions from the perspective of cognitive evaluation and advocate that emotions are evaluative judgments. The Perceptual Theories of Emotion have made some modifications to the evaluative judgment of emotions, attempting to propose better theories. The Perceptual Theories of Emotion advocate verifying the similarities between emotions and perceptions through analogical reasoning. However, the Perceptual Theories of Emotion also have their problems. Compared to the Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion and the Perceptual Theories of Emotion, the Embodied Emotion Theory has significant advantages, mainly reflected in avoiding the drawbacks of over-intellectualize emotions by evaluative judgments; infants and animals can also understand emotions through non-conceptualized ways of self-awareness and understanding of social rules and norms; the core relational property of emotions revealed in the embodied emotion theory demonstrates the action orientation of emotions, connects the organism’s body and external environment, and integrates both biological and social aspects, further clarifying the complexity and diversity of emotions.

The paper discusses three talks, which were given at the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin) in the mid-1870s. In these talks, the principles of some main movements in contemporary philosophy (realism, absolute idealism, critical idealism) were elaborated and contrasted to each other. The paper focuses on the concepts of real-idealism and ideal-realism. All the discussants, Friedrich Frederichs, C. L. Michelet and J. H. von Kirchmann, introduce these concepts. Frederichs, an adherent of critical idealism, argues only for the standpoint of real-idealism. Michelet, G. W. F. Hegel’s personal student and an adherent of absolute idealism, takes real-idealism and ideal-realism to be the two sides of the one coin. Kirchmann, an advocate of realism, regards real-idealism as an objective, and he is skeptical about the possibility to achieve it

In addition to its main theme of freedom, Hegel’s political philosophy addresses the problem of poverty. This article proposes a theoretical foundation for a Hegelian welfare state by demonstrating how its rationale and concepts are derived from Hegel’s political philosophy. Poverty constitutes a fundamental deficiency in the modern liberal state focused on the self-actualization of its citizens. This poverty is not an accidental but a structural factor of modern market society, resulting from economic contingencies. The poor rabble is deprived of the opportunities for self-actualization that market society provides. Therefore, the main task of a Hegelian welfare state is to secure the right of subsistence as a condition of the possibility of self-actualization. Without subsistence citizens are unable to develop and actualize their free will through property formation in market society. Derived from Hegel’s right of necessity and the guiding principle of freedom, the right of subsistence is paramount to the legitimacy of the state. Therefore, it cannot be left to the contingent morality of private charity. The right of subsistence does not only guarantee mere survival, but also includes a minimum of property needed to participate in market society.

This paper scrutinizes the dialogical character of knowledge from the perspectives of Hegel’s and Davidson’s philosophies. First, it outlines their analogous trains of thought, particularly their “anti-representational” and “intersubjective” accounts of knowledge. Second, it draws a parallel between the two by discussing their contrasting views of the structure and goal of knowledge, showing that while Davidson advocates an open-ended, scheme-less empirical knowledge, Hegel maintains the notion of a (universal-rational) scheme and a goal-oriented dialectical process in which “the true is the whole.” This section then critically traces their underlying disagreement to their divergent views on the nature of meaning, language, and thought. Finally, it argues that their views can be seen as complementary to two versions of dialectic, showing that while Hegel’s approach, akin to Platonic dialectic, focuses on the self-contained and “Truth”-oriented “negotiational” movement of ideas, Davidson’s, reminiscent of Socratic elenchus, emphasizes the truth-oriented ‘conversational’ interaction of subjects exchanging concepts.

Hinging on a metaphysical examination of the concept of newness and Paul Guyer’s notion of the temporally extended self, this article analyzes what it means that we are a temporally extended being that is fashioned in time, which is none other than a transcendental object = newness, and argues that (fashioned) bodies can be things in themselves and mere phenomena simultaneously. Kant’s doctrine of self-positing assists us in decoding how the subject obtains an embodied experience while a thing in itself, as well as how both a non-empirical affection and an empirical affection are at play, casually affecting the subject. By looking into how double affection is in operation, this article aims to broaden our understanding of Kant’s theory of self-consciousness.

This paper reinterprets Kant’s argument that conscience cannot err, in light of assessing the influence of Baumgarten’s opposite argument about an erring conscience. I thereby argue that, contra Kant and in agreement with Baumgarten, we have a duty to acquire the capacity of conscience and that we must develop our acute awareness of handling unwelcome events precisely because conscience is involved in deciding the inherent goodness of an action and yet prone to make mistakes. In substantiating this argument, I demonstrate that it is helpful to demarcate self-judgment as a separate faculty in Kant’s theory of conscience.

In this paper, I argue that, on a reductionist reading of Buddhist no-self ontology, Buddhists could not have sincere ethical intentions toward persons. And if Buddhists cannot have sincere intentions toward persons, they cannot have second-personal moral reasons for acting. From this I conclude that Buddhists fail to qualify as genuine members of the moral community if, as some contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophers argue, such membership depends on an individual agent’s having the capacity to be motivated by second-personal moral reasons.

Smith asks whether patriotism and cosmopolitanism spring from the same source. If they do, we face two anomalies. First, we should expect a British subject to love France more than Great Britain because France has a larger population than Great Britain. Second, we should expect a British subject to love France more than a far-away country such as China given that the British subject is more familiar with the French than with the Chinese people. Both expectations are factually untrue. This led Smith to reject the patriotism-cosmopolitanism continuum thesis. The love of country must spring from a source that is unrelated to the love of humankind. Nonetheless, neither kind of love can be reduced to substantive utility that informs the economist’s utility function and the social welfare function. Substantive utility appears as self-interest and other-interest (altruism). The altruist preference varies in intensity, depending on familiarity: people are ready to help more familiar people than less familiar ones. What complicates the discussion is that Smith uses the same term “familiarity” to discuss varying degrees of love: people tend to love more familiar people than less familiar ones. This paper sheds light on Smith’s confusing concept “universal benevolence”—which is best understood as the love of humankind.

The uniqueness of Edith Stein’s approach to lived experience emerges only in light of intentionality as reasonableness. The “personal touch” or authentic affectivity means in this context one’s own “living body” in regard to a threefold dimension of the human experiencing: the personal, the humanistic, and the spiritual, and seems to echo those of Immanuel Kant’s, i.e., the soul, the world and God. Consequently, not whatever kind of own’s commitment is at stake. Moreover, no less important is the role of community and its various types. For sure, Stein’s genuine account is found in dialogue with the phenomenologists of her time. It paves the way toward a community of life and life itself. Therefore, it seems to be possible to some extend to accord Stein’s account with contemporary discussions of the meaning of life and “a fundamental transformation of human existence.”

In this article after identifying four major trends in the discourse on Ethiopian philosophy, it will be argued that there is a need to introduce a mature conception of Ethiopian philosophy that can both diagnose existential predicaments and also has the ability of introducing an emancipatory dimension. At the heart of this article is the claim that there are four major trends in Ethiopian philosophy which is a discourse that is still looking for an identity and that these trends are characterized by hermeneutics, intercultural philosophy, critical theory and indigenous Ethiopian philosophy. After identifying the limitations of the four trends in Ethiopian philosophy, the article will point towards the development of a new discourse in Ethiopian philosophy that has the power of pointing towards the emergence of a new discourse that is able to diagnose existing realties and also can engage in a dialogue with other philosophical traditions.

This article is devoted to the consideration of the problem of loneliness as a phenomenon of the modern world. The individual and his inner world are losing their primacy in the sphere of global political and economic changes in the modern world. The relevance of this study lies in the fact that loneliness is one of the most acute and pressing problems of society today, this problem determines the need for a theoretical basis and a modern concept of the phenomenon of loneliness. This is not only a phenomenon in the life of a person, but also a crucial social phenomenon that requires deep and comprehensive social and philosophical understanding. The aim of this study is to provide theoretical justification for the phenomenon of loneliness as a phenomenon in modern society. The methodological basis of the research on the topic of study was the actual works of domestic and foreign scientists, who consider in their works such a phenomenon as loneliness. In order to achieve the stated goal of research and solve all the tasks, the following research methods were used: analysis, synthesis and generalization of scientific journalism, as well as classification. The circumstances and factors that determine the prevalence and level of loneliness in modern society of the Republic of Kazakhstan are considered. The theoretical meaning of the concept of “loneliness,” its social conditions, as well as the factors of the emergence and spread of the phenomenon of loneliness has been analyzed. This article analyses several current classifications of loneliness in the modern world, developed by domestic and foreign researchers. The emphasis is on causes, symptoms of loneliness as a phenomenon. The study showed that loneliness is an integral part of every person’s life, as well as having its advantages and disadvantages. The practical value of the study lies in the fact that the material considered in the scientific article can be used by psychologists and sociologists of the Republic of Kazakhstan to analyze this phenomenon when working with the population in the state.

At every level, the study of organic life underlies the relational nature of its subject. Whether one looks at an organism as a whole and its relationship to its environment or other members of its species, or at the component parts of the organism at an organ system, cellular or even molecular level, there is an externally referential and thus relational nature to lived beings. There is perhaps no place as fruitful to illustrate this relationality than the field of immunology. This paper argues that close attention to the phenomenon of relationality that is evidenced by natural scientific research provides an important occasion to demonstrate the wide-ranging validity of the sort of relational ontology defended by the tradition of phenomenological personalism. Such intersections as one discerns in interdisciplinary engagement between personalist phenomenology and immunology, moreover, can provide a basis for further clarification of the relation of person to the world of nature and vice versa in ways that call into question the dominance of reductive philosophies of nature.

This paper examines the use of the painting metaphor in the Republic, showing that earlier mentions of painting suggest an understanding of mimesis at odds with the critique of book X, and argues that this disagreement can only be understood in the dialogical context of the work as a whole. Early on, painters are said to be able to produce images truer and more beautiful than any existing object, and both the depiction of the city in speech itself and its realization in practice are compared to the act of painting. Read in this context, the critique of mimesis in book X can be seen as a challenge to one of the central arguments of the Republic. But in critiquing images as representation of reality it leaves untouched the metaphorical use of images, and so allows the city in speech to fulfill its original purpose as an analogy for the soul.

Only concreta are causative, though other things can play a passive part in enabling them to do the causing that they do. Nonconcreta—platonic universals included—are just the instrumental and ethical values of concreta. There is no sense of the word in which both concreta and nonconcreta “exist”; but, coining one, we can say nothing “exists,” in that coined sense, over and above concreta, their vicissitudes and their values. That is nominalism.

On its twenty-fifth anniversary, Fides et ratio remains relevant for its bold defense of reason and the complementarity of faith and reason. It describes a philosophy that is not the preserve of academics but the duty of every person. It asserts that philosophy is never contained in one system but is always open to new questions and further insights. St. John Paul defends a philosophy that welcomes pluralism based on the richness of being but rejects a pluralism based on the impossibility of knowing the truth. Reflecting on Fides et ratio, this article describes six ways that theology uses philosophy and offers five lessons for philosophers, i.e., the universal character of philosophy, the complementarity of faith and reason, the necessity and limits of pluralism, the requirements for a philosophy to be consonant with theology, and the current reinvigoration of philosophy in seminaries.

In this paper, I argue for the necessity of including what I call “categorical norms” in Thomas Aquinas’s account of the ground of obligation (normativity theory) by drawing on the value phenomenology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. A categorical norm is one conceptually irreducible to any non-normative concept and which obligates us irrespective of pre-existing aims, goals, or desires. I show that Thomistic normativity theory on any plausible reading of Aquinas lacks categorical norms and then raise two serious objections which constitute master arguments against it. The upshot is that this theory requires reform. I end by proposing work remaining for such reform, namely, an expansion of the Thomistic metaphysic and anthropology.

Hebrews 4:15 says that Jesus was tempted like other human beings yet never sinned. Sinlessness is not the same as impeccability. Chalcedonian Christology or some variant of it seems necessary to show that Jesus was metaphysically unable to sin. Metaphysical impossibility to sin, though, appears to rule out temptation as experienced by ordinary human beings. This paper argues that Oliver D. Crisp, T. A. Hart, Brian Leftow, and Gerald O’Collins all fall short in trying to show how Jesus was both impeccable and tempted as we are.

As wars today involve the use of sophisticated weapons such as autonomous ones, this paper aims to address the moral permissibility of using autonomous weapons systems (AWS) in wars. In the debate on autonomous weapons, advocates argue based on AWS’s precision of targets (Arkin 2018) and it not being clouded by emotional judgments (Marchant, et.al 2011) and prohibitors who comment on the ethical and legal implications of autonomous weapons (A. Sharkey 2019; Blanchard 2022). However, there has been relatively little development of compliance of the autonomous weapons with all the principles of jus in bello, amongst the scholarship as well as its engagement with the just war framework broadly. To assess the moral compliance of AWS, the paper focuses on just conduct or the jus in bello principles. It closely examines all the three principles of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality that makeup just conduct as well as the legal body of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Through a close analysis of all the principles of jus in bello against the use of autonomous weapons, this paper will result in the incompatibility of such weapons with the ethical framework of just war theory that gives out the norms for just and fair conduct during wars. It will thereby lead to a further reflection on the compliance of autonomous weapons as per jus in bello and the IHL to have greater restrain and ethical conduct during wars.

Many contemporary philosophers of mind disagree with substance dualism, saying that despite the failure of physical theories of mind, substance dualism cannot be advocated, because it faces more serious problems than physical theories, lacking compatibility with philosophical arguments and scientific evidence. Regardless of the validity of the arguments in support of substance dualism, it is demonstrated in this article that this theory is coherent, with no philosophical or scientific problems. The main arguments of opponents of substance dualism are explained and criticized in this respect. Based on this, it becomes clear that the interaction of soul and body has a reasonable philosophical explanation, the problem of the pairing of soul and body, although it may not have a scientific explanation, it has a philosophical and theological solution, the principle of the physical causal closure lacks conclusive reasons and cannot reject the existence of the soul, the existence of the soul does not contradict the theory of evolution, the dependence of the soul on the brain is compatible with its independence, and finally, the principle of simplicity does not make any problem for accepting the substance dualism.

The epistemic value problem—that of explaining why knowledge is valuable, and in particular why it is more valuable than lesser epistemic standings, such as true belief—remains unsolved. Here, I argue that this problem can be solved by combining proper functionalism about knowledge with perfectionism about goodness. I begin by laying out the epistemic value problem and the extant challenges to solving it. I then proceed to begin solving the problem by explicating a broad and ecumenical form of proper functionalism. I finish solving the problem by introducing the perfectionist theory of value and then showing how that theory of goodness, in tandem with proper functionalism, solves the epistemic value problem.

This paper argues that we care especially about human health because of what we are and because of how we function properly. First, an argument is made against a mechanistic and for a holistic account of human nature. Second, it is argued that humans function properly when they are disposed to deliberate and decide easily and accurately about the means of health, deem that unrestraint pleasure hinders health as well as that combated disease furthers health, and judge it right to will what health others are due.

Basing itself on the cognitive theory of the modern Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan, the article conducts a critical appraisal of the notion of intuitive knowledge (?ads in Arabic) as espoused by the famous medieval Islamic philosopher Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). The article shows the ways in which Lonergan’s crucial distinction between the objectivity as the knower’s intelligent grasp of the real and the objectivity as the knower’s critical affirmation of the real, revises the epistemological primacy of intuitivism that is endemic not only to Avicennian thought in particular but also to Aristotelian tradition generally. At the same time, it shows various elements of continuity between Lonergan’s and Avicenna’s analyses of intentional consciousness. It argues that, while Lonergan’s thought revises Avicenna’s lack of attention to the role of one’s further rational affirmation of anything that one has gasped only intuitively, Lonergan’s cognitive theory might conceptually benefit from a number of original Avicennian insights when it comes to one’s experiential and intelligent grasp of the objects of one’s consciousness.

My purpose here is to focus on an aspect of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy which has not yet been fully explored, namely the way in which his insights border on being as much aesthetic as they are philosophical. I am suggesting that his work can be seen as an effort to redirect our attention away from the usual issues of linguistic philosophy and towards a broader perspective on the task of thinking about the nature of the relationship between language and the world. I shall draw briefly on the writings of J. L. Austin in order to amplify this perspective.

This paper discusses Avicenna’s concept of ambiguity/analogy and argues that while Avicenna doesn’t mention it explicitly there is an analogy of the predication of being between creatures and God, the Necessary of Existence. A consequence of this analogical predication is that for Avicenna, like Aquinas, God does not fall under the subject of metaphysics common being or being qua being. If the predication were univocal as some scholars contend such as Timothy Noone and Olga Lizzini, then God would fall under the subject of metaphysics, common being as he does according to Ramon Guerrero and John Wippel. This paper has three parts. First, it discusses the comparison between Avicenna and Aristotle on pros hen equivocation/analogy. Second, it discusses the texts within Avicenna which suggest an analogical predication and which can reasonably be seen as establishing a transcendental predication between God and creatures. Finally, it develops the consequences of Avicenna’s view for the relationship between God and the subject of metaphysics common being or being qua being and argues that God does not fall under common being.

This article explores the tension between the antithetical philosophies of empiricism and innatism underlying Chomskyan linguistics. It first follows the trail of empiricism in North American linguistics, starting from the work of Leonard Bloomfield at the beginning of the 20th century, and its influence on the Chomskyan paradigm, after which the Kantian trail of innatism initiated by Chomsky himself is reconnoitered. It is argued that the Chomskyan approach to natural language represents a paradigmatic example of the unsavory consequences of the divorce between mind and matter instituted by Kant, in particular because human language involves an intimate relation between both types of reality. In Chomsky’s Generative Grammar, on the other hand, the material side of language is treated as completely autonomous from its mental correlate and analyzed in terms of a priori conceptual structures and computational operations; for its part, the mental side of language is treated as innate; the relation between the two is thus made utterly obscure and incomprehensible. The conclusion of the article argues in favour of a more balanced approach inspired by Aristotelianism and Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics.

From the literature on Schopenhauer, it seems that he suggested only three ways of life to contend with the Will. I argue for a fourth, which is intended for the common person. A way that Schopenhauer himself lived by. The fourth way of life is derived from a broader reading of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, that is, reading his philosophy as ways of life. The other three ways relate to the three plains on which life enfolds: relations between the individual and objects, the relations between the individual and other individuals, and the relations between the individual and herself. The fourth way involves all three.

Thomists do not have an account of how modern mathematics relates to classical mathematics or more generally fits into the Aristotelian hierarchy of sciences. Rather than treat primarily of Aquinas’s theses on mathematical abstraction, I turn to considering what modern mathematics is in itself, seen from a broadly classical perspective. I argue that many modern quantities can be considered to be, not quantities as such or in themselves, but derived quantities, i.e., quantities that can be defined wholly in terms of the principles of number or magnitude. I also interpret the parts of modern mathematics that study quantitative change as being properly-speaking parts of natural philosophy, for example, probability theory, statistics, calculus, etc. In conclusion, I consider the place that quantity as such has in the order of the world and why we should expect the world to be highly mathematical, as we have found it to be.

The argument rests on earlier work questioning the Russellian separation of levels and arguing that Russellian levels should be taken to include the levels of particle and aggregate, and generality and detail. That earlier work argues from the non-separation of particle and aggregate that predictability is limited and that physics cannot come to an end. This leads to a view of the world as flux. Identifiable objects demanding explanation can only be temporary entities emerging from flux and explanation can only be local and historical. This precludes explanation of totality and leads us to reject Leibniz’s question. Baldwin’s argument from possible worlds theory that a null world is possible is examined and questioned. Koon’s combination of the kalam argument with the grim reaper paradox is not queried but a way is found of circumventing it. It is noted in passing that the argument does not have the anti-theistic implications which may appear.

For a given decision, when an undemocratic procedure would result in a good outcome, and a democratic procedure would result in a bad outcome, which decision procedure ought we to use? Epistemic democrats, such as Joseph Schumpeter, argue that all else being equal, we should prefer the procedure with the good outcome. Schumpeter’s argument for this position is that we must reject the view that only democratic procedures matter when evaluating government institutions (pure proceduralism), and the only alternative to pure proceduralism that can coherently describe the relationship between democracy and the public interest is pure instrumentalism. I argue that Schumpeter’s argument for epistemic democracy does not succeed. In this paper, I outline three alternative ways of conceiving of the relationship between democracy and the public interest, which I call evaluative dualism, impure instrumentalism, and impure proceduralism. I explain how, with any of these three alternative views, we can evaluate government institutions without rejecting the intrinsic value of democratic procedures or the public interest.

The aim of this paper is to show how systematic Charles Taylor’s philoso?phy is. It rejects two opposite readings: one claiming that Taylor’s thought is too diverse to have real unity; the other, that it is the product of a “monomaniac” (Taylor’s own word). I claim that his thought has a very distinct structure, comprising two levels. On the first, “meta-hermeneutic” level, Taylor defends a thesis about hermeneutics (namely, that it cannot be dispensed with): this unifies his anthropology, epistemology, moral philosophy, philosophy of language and political philosophy. On the second, “hermeneutic” level, Taylor builds an impressive historic construal of modern identity and its dilemmas. More importantly, while these two levels are irreducibly distinct, they relate to each other in interesting ways, giving Taylor’s philosophy its systematicity. I finally confront this view with other readings, and argue that it is the best way to understand Taylor’s work.

Those who occupy positions of authority such as public officials and corporate executives frequently find themselves in contexts in which their choices can be expected to have consequences regarding the distribution of benefits and burdens among various stakeholders. How should such people reason in such contexts so as not to be biased? Herein I set forth and critically examine two answers to this question. The first is based on the work of John Rawls and is intuitively attractive. Nevertheless, I argue that there is reason to question its plausibility. The second is based on the work of John Finnis and is initially not intuitively attractive. Nevertheless, I develop a defense of it. If my defense of the second answer is plausible, what those who occupy positions of authority should do so as not to be biased when making choices in contexts of distributive choice is quite different than what is commonly supposed.

In a recent paper, Chunghyoung Lee argues that, because zygotes are developmentally plastic, they cannot be numerically identical to the singletons into which they develop, thereby undermining conceptionism. In this short paper, I respond to Lee. I argue, first, that, on the most popular theories of personal identity, zygotic plasticity does not undermine conceptionism, and, second, that, even overlooking this first issue, Lee’s plasticity argument is problematic. My goal in all of this is not to take a stand in the abortion debate, which I remain silent on here, but, rather, to push for the conclusion that transitivity fails when we are talking about numerical identity of non-abstract objects.

In this paper, I focus my attention on I and Thou as an important text in the philosophy of religion which goes beyond the traditional opposition of theism and atheism by proposing a different way of thinking about God and the nature of religious belief. I begin with a basic account of Buber’s position in Part One of I and Thou, and then I move on to the philosophy of God in Part Three which is built upon this initial discussion. In the rest of the paper, I examine some of the implications of Buber’s perspective for the meaning of “belief in God” and how this affects traditional theism and atheism. My sense is that I and Thou has been very influential, but in recent years it has been unfairly neglected. One of the goals of this paper is to show that I and Thou is still important, for as a singular text that transcends the ordinary boundaries of philosophy, theology, and literature it remains compelling and appeals to many who have different religious beliefs, as well as those who have none.

Creationism is an important feature of Christianity but seems very foreign to Chinese philosophy. This paper examines an early attempt at introducing a metaphysical account of creationism in Huanyou quan (1628) by the Portuguese Jesuit, Francisco Furtado, and the Chinese scholar, Li Zhizao. It investigates the sources drawn from the works of Thomas Aquinas and reconstructs the choices made by the two authors in their translation. Finally, it suggests that Thomistic creationism bears similarities with Chinese philosophy.

In an earlier paper, Mark Spencer synthesized three understandings of divine simplicity, arguing that the Thomist account can be enriched by Scotist and Palamite distinctions. After summarizing that earlier work, this paper builds upon it in four main ways. Firstly, it relates Scotus’ logical (diminished) univocity to Aquinas’ metaphysical analogy in language about God. Secondly, it explores the limits of univocity and the formal distinction as applied to the divine essence (in the Palamite sense), utilising the scientific metaphor of tomography. Thirdly, it defends Palamite energies from the charge of being Thomistic accidents by introducing the concept of “intrinsic ramification” and applying that concept to the Thomistic divine ideas. Fourthly, it tabulates some significant pre-existing parallels between the three systems’ nomenclature in referring to similar aspects of the divine.

Pursuing a suggestion made by Christopher Stead in his book Divine Substance and employing distinctions made by Gottlob Frege in his article “Concept and Object,” it becomes possible to answer a common charge against Trinitarian Theism: its alleged inconsistency in claiming that, while there is only one God, there are also three “persons,” each rightly named “God.” The argument advanced, while supporting the logical coherence of traditional Trinitarian Theism, also defends the orthodoxy of the controversial “Social Trinitarianism” associated with Richard of Saint Victor.

Although the philosophical ideas of the English philosopher Robin George Collingwood on history and art have often been compared with those of the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, an in-depth comparison between their concepts of metaphysics was never made. Therefore, the focus in this article is on both authors’ concepts of metaphysics. It is shown that, despite the undeniable affinity, their views of the status of metaphysics differ substantially. Both Dilthey and Collingwood focus on an inherent antinomy in the project of metaphysics. On the one hand, there is the inescapable relativity of all time-bound ways of thinking and their results; on the other, there is the metaphysical search for objective and generally accepted knowledge of reality as a whole. For Dilthey, the awareness of its historical character reveals the impossibility for metaphysics to provide a foundation for natural and human sciences alike. Collingwood’s aim, by contrast, is to safeguard the possibility of metaphysics as a historical science to supply an enduring foundation of natural and human sciences. To clarify this radical difference with regard to the role of metaphysics, I make three steps. First, I situate Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics within the context of his work in order to present his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Second, I focus on the role of Collingwood’s reform of metaphysics and his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Finally, I relate the different status of their views of metaphysics to their divergent interpretations of human finitude.

Absolutism—the idea that some kinds of acts are absolutely wrong and must never be done—plays an important role in medical ethics. Nicholas Denyer has defended it from some influential consequentialist critics who have alleged that absolutism is committed to “agent-relative constraints” and therefore intolerably complex and messy. Denyer ingeniously argues that, if there are problems with agent-relative constraints, then they are problems for consequentialism, since it contains agent-relative constraints, too. I show that, despite its ingenuity, Denyer’s argument does not succeed. The defense of absolutism must move to other grounds.

The purpose of this article is to provide a case against certain claims made by modal skeptics with a specific application to the debate about whether conceivability is the right notion to employ in justifying the move from some state of affairs being conceivable to its being metaphysically possible. Does conceivability provide adequate, defeasible grounds for inferring metaphysical possibility? If not, is there a better approach that employs a replacement for conceivability? I argue that conceivability should be abandoned in favor of rational intuitions understood in a way I hope to make clear and precise.To accomplish this purpose, I begin by examing the general way conceivability has been related to metaphysical possibility and opt for a replacement for conceivability. Next, I make clear and precise what I mean by that replacement—rational intuitions. Third, I present three representative accounts of modal knowledge offered by Timothy O’Connor, George Bealer, and Edmund Husserl. O’Connor’s account is externalist, Bealer’s is a hybrid between an internalist and externalist view, and Husserl’s is a purely internalist perspective. While all three are plausible perspectives, I will criticize and reject the first two accounts and argue that Husserl’s way out of modal skepticism is successful. I conclude that Husserl’s employment of rational intuition made precise by his notions of eidetic and categorial intuition, provides a rigorous, fruitful way to ground modal knowledge in general, and de re and de dicto possibility in particular.

The so-called “analytical” appendix to the first part of Spinoza’s Ethics has at times puzzled scholars. It notably breaks with the geometrical method adopted in most of the text, and includes an impassioned argument against teleology, popular morality, and, ultimately, the faculty of imagination. In this essay I seek to resolve this interpretive diffi?culty by side-by-side comparison with philosophical resources from one of Spinoza’s main influences. In particular, I argue that analysis of the appendix to the first part of his Ethics is benefitted by comparison with certain Maimonidean arguments regarding the “imagina?tion”—themselves part of a long tradition of debate on the powers of the imaginative faculty in ancient and medieval philosophy—contained in The Guide of the Perplexed. I introduce and trace this connection across both texts. This helps us to better appreciate both the ap?pendix and its place within the Ethics and Spinoza’s sustained, complicated relationship with Medieval Judaism’s greatest thinker.

In this essay, I discuss the essence of truth. In order to do so, I continue a fecund dialogue between Husserlian phenomenology, as recapitulated by Robert Sokolowski, and Aristotelian metaphysics, as developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. Integrating these phil?osophical approaches enables us to see that beings reveal themselves to us through their activities, both substantial and accidental, and that the active self-disclosure of things can be identified with their intelligibility. It is this objective yet potential intelligibility that we disclose and activate when we think about things truthfully by articulating them in the medium of speech. I therefore define truth as the human person’s syntactic activation of the potential intelligibility of things, and I conclude by showing how these reflections lead us to acknowledge God as the highest and first Truth.

Rationality should not be seen as a ghostly process exclusive of the world of matter, but rather as a transcendent process within matter itself by virtue of a participated power. A Thomistic metaphysics of embodied participation in being effectively answers Robert Pasnau’s objection that the standard hylomorphic account confuses ontological and representational immateriality, and is more satisfying than nonreductive physicalist accounts of rationality, and the Anglo-American hylomorphic accounts reliant on formal causality. When the active intellect is understood as a participated power and not as a formal or constitutive principle of rationality, the transcendent basis of rationality is clarified; all embodied rational operations are seen to utilize, without being reduced to, a substrate of neurophysiological systems, processes and structures. I utilise an allegory of alien abduction, to illustrate participation as a key to understanding the intrinsic relationship between transcendent, immaterial thought and embodiment.

A growing number of scholars have suggested that there is a unique I-You relation that obtains between persons in face-to-face encounters, but while the increased attention paid to the second-person has led to many important insights regarding the nature of this relation, there is still much work to be done to clarify what makes the second-person relation distinct. In this paper we wish to develop recent scholarship on the second-person by means of a phenomenological analysis of a doctor-patient interaction. In such an interaction the doctor and patient continuously shift between the observational I-It and the interactive I-You, and recognizing the difference between observation and interaction not only helps to defend the claim that this relation is sui generis, but also uncovers the co-constitution of experience from within this relation. As we argue, engaging another second-personally involves a shared experience that is a result of incorporating the other’s mental states into one’s own while standing in the second-person relation.

This paper tries to show that there is an important virtue (with no generally recognized name) that could be called “accountability.” This virtue is a trait of a person who embraces being held accountable and consistently displays excellence in relations in which the person is held accountable. After describing the virtue in more detail, including its motivational profile, some core features of this virtue are described. Empirical implications and an agenda for future research are briefly discussed. Possible objections to the virtue are considered and rebutted, and relations to other virtues, particularly the personal virtue of justice, are discussed. In conclusion, we suggest that though this virtue has not received the attention it deserves in contemporary society, it has been more clearly recognized in other cultures. Some of the reasons for the partial eclipse of the virtue are understandable and justifiable, but there are good reasons to think our society would be improved if we paid more attention to accountability from a virtue perspective.

Certain teachings found in Gadamer’s hermeneutics (especially as presented in his major work Truth and Method) are examined in order to help cultivate the historically-minded theological methodology proposed by Thomistic thinker Benedict Ashley. Consideration is given to four Gadamerian themes mentioned in Ashley’s introduction to Theologies of the Body: (1) Interpretation is an intellectual inquiry that can be enriched by adopting hermeneutic reflection where such reflection is understood as a kind of a contemplative meta-praxis. (2) Interpretation as the search for understanding involves a heuristic process. (3) Hermeneutic reflection facilitates an interpreter becoming aware that the work of interpretation itself occurs within a historical context. (4) The process of interpretation is incomplete without the contemporary application of what is understood. With respect to each of these four themes, Ashley’s work is considered first and then the same topics are considered as found in the writings of Gadamer.

Plato’s Timaeus reveals a cosmos governed by Necessity and Intellect; commentators have debated the relationship between them. Non-literalists hold that the demiurge (Intellect), having carte blanche in taming Necessity, is omnipotent. But this omnipotence, alongside the attributes of benevolence and omniscience, creates problems when non-literalists address the problem of evil. We take the demiurge rather as limited by Necessity. This position is supported by episodes within the text, and by its larger consonance with Plato’s philosophy of evil and responsibility. By recognizing the analogy between man and demiurge, the literal reading provides a moral component that its non-literal counterpart lacks.

After reviewing various formulations of the problems of universals and individuation, this essay considers the dialectic that informs the relationship between the two. This dialectic involves a distinction between a realist theory of universals that satisfies the requirements of science but fails to account for the non-instantiability of individuals and a nominalist theory of universals that fails to satisfy the requirements of science but accounts for the non-instantiability of individuals. Inadequacies found in one view tend to motivate movement to the other view. But, like a pendulum swing, this movement inevitably involves facing what motivated the original view. This dialectic is illustrated by a consideration of the views of five medieval authors: Boethius, Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham.

In this essay I revisit Kant’s largely-ignored Third Analogy of Experience with an eye to what it may yet contribute to our understanding of time perception. The essay begins with an elucidation of the purpose of the Third Analogy, followed by an account of how the core argument is intended to work. It then summarizes the problem that has left the Third Analogy out of much of the scholarly literature on Kant. I respond by introducing two ways of scaling back on Kant’s claims. First, I offer a revisionary interpretation of the Third Analogy as a “modest” transcendental argument; second, I propose a re-imagining of the Analogy such that it yields an empirical hypothesis that might be of use in developmental psychology.

This article deals with the question of existence by considering the way in which phenomenology has faced this issue. To provide an argument against the ontological certainties typical of idealism and realism, I try to show the possibility of a subjective reduction of the question of existence and to highlight the way in which the concept of existence may be “undermined” by this reduction. A prominent place is given to the concept of infinity for radically reassessing the content and scope of the concept of existence. I try to integrate some of the main themes of Husserlian phenomenology without being restrictively committed to it. I include some discussion of foundational mathematics and of quantum physics.

The present article argues: that to support the primary aim of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, which is to establish the primacy of practical reason for religion (and thereby to criticize the subversion of religion qua supra-moral “ecclesiastical faith”), Kant elaborates and assigns to it a social ethics. Contrary to the tired adage that without religious foundation ethics must collapse, the reverse is actually the case: without ethical foundation religion must collapse, degenerating into dogmatism, superstition and fanaticism. To ground and concretize the link between ethics and religion Kant elaborates a three layered “anthropology” of human sociality upon which religion builds its communities (“church”) wherein holiness consists above all in the solidarity of ethical striving to achieve virtue for each and justice for all. Despite his good intentions, however, and independent of the question of the legitimacy of ethical religion, Kant fails in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone owing to the imposition of a debilitating formalism owing to an undiminished allegiance to the epistemological strictures and structures—the Transcendental Idealism—of the Critique of Pure Reason.

In his book The Acting Person Karol Wojty?a makes frequent references to the concept of truth. He analyzes truth expressions in various realms, including the epistemological, the metaphysical, the moral, and the axiological. He does not, however, say exactly what he means by truth. This essay analyzes select passages from this book and tries to formulate a coherent understanding of truth as Wojty?a conceived it. This essay puts special emphasis on the question of axiological truth, for this concept is novel within the Thomistic framework of philosophizing and seems to be a consequence of the philosopher’s encounter with phenomenology. In the centre of attention is the first edition of this book published in 1969 in Poland. The main intention of the article is to grasp the very first Wojtylian approach to the problem of truth.

Patrick Byrne argues that MacIntyre’s account of practical reasoning is inadequate because it is based upon a notion of flourishing that places too much emphasis on impersonal facts, likewise because it is excessively focused on means without considering the role of desire for ends, and because it is does not account for the role of feelings in explaining how knowledge of ends is attained. In this essay, I argue that MacIntyre’s account provides adequate responses to each of these concerns. But more broadly, I argue that Byrne is right to suggest that a Lonerganian perspective offers important insights that can extend MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian practical philosophy. Specifically, Lonergan’s account of the generalized empirical method may inform MacIntyre’s theory of rival, and potentially incommensurable traditions, explaining how standards of argument are both transcultural and historically articulated.